'Race': normative, not metaphysical or semantic by Mallon, Ronald
‘R a c e ’ : N o r m a t i v e ,  N o t  M e t a p h y s i c a l  o r  
S e m a n t i c *
R m  M a U o n
The truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world 
that can do all we ask “race” to do for us. (K. Anthony Appiah)
For most of us that there are different races of people is one of 
the most obvious features of our social worlds. (Lucius Outlaw)
Eliminativist approaches have failed to recognize more subtle ways 
in which divisions into races might have biological significance. 
(Philip Hitcher)1
In recent years, there has been a flurry of work on the metaphysics of 
race. While it is now widely accepted that races do not share robust, 
biobehavioral essences, opinions differ over what, if anything, race is. 
Recent work has been divided between three apparently quite different 
answers. A variety of theorists argue for racial skepticism, the view that 
races do not exist at all.2 A second group defends racial constructionism,s
* I would like to thank Robin Andreasen, Anthony Appiah, Aryn Conrad, Steve 
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oi-Blood Rule,” Forbes 158 (1996): 48; Donal Muir, “Race: The Mythic Root of Racism,” 
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holding that races are in some way socially constructed.4 And a third 
group maintains racial population naturalism., the view that races may exist 
as biologically salient populations, albeit ones that do not have the 
biologically determ ined social significance once im puted to them .5 The 
three groups thus seem to disagree fundamentally on the metaphysical 
character of race.
Closely related to the metaphysics of race is the normative question, 
“W hat ought we to do with ‘race’ talk?”6 By ‘race’ talk, I mean the 
practices of using terms like ‘race’, ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘Asian’, and ‘His­
panic’ (and their associated concepts) to label and differentially treat 
persons. Typically there is a close association between metaphysical po­
sitions on race and normative positions on ‘race’ talk. Racial skeptics 
typically hold that the nonexistence of race supports ‘race’ talk elimi- 
nativism. Since race does no t exist, it would be false and misleading to 
continue to use ‘race’ talk as if it does. In contrast, racial constructionists 
and population naturalists hold that ‘race’ talk picks out something real, 
and they typically support (implicitly or explicitly) some version of ‘race’ 
talk conservationism.'
University Press, 1998); Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United 
States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (New York: Routledge, 1994); Lucius Outlaw, “Toward a 
Critical Theory of ‘R ace /” and “O n W. E. B. DuBois’s ‘The Conservation of R aces/” in 
Bell and Blumenfeld, Overcoming Racism and Sexism, 79-102, and On Race and Philosophy 
(New York: Routledge, 1996); Adrian Piper, “Passing for White, Passing for Black,” Tran­
sition 58 (1992): 4-32; Michael Root, “I low We Divide the World,” Philosophy o f Science 67 
(2000): S628-S639; Ronald Sundstrom, “Racial Nominalism,” Journal o f Social Philosophy 
33 (2002): 193-210; Paul Taylor, “Appiah’s Uncom pleted Argument: DuBois and the Re­
ality o f Race,” Social Theory and Practice 26 (2000): 103-28.
4. The term “social construction” is sometimes used to identify the first view, the view 
that race does no t exist at all (and is merely a social construction). In contrast, I use it 
as a label for the view defended by the second group, the view that race exists bu t is a 
social construction.
5. Robin Andreasen, “A New Perspective on  the Race Debate,” British Journal o f the 
Philosophy o f Science 49 (1998): 199-225, and “Race: Biological Reality or Social Construct?” 
Philosophy o f Science 67 (2000): S653-S666; Kitcher, “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture.”
6. To say these questions are normative is also to imply that they are action guiding 
and may involve a wide range of moral, semantic, prudential, or o ther considerations.
7. The rough distinction between eliminativists and conservationists admits of many 
finer distinctions. For example, because elim ination of ‘race’ talk takes time, theorists 
differ over the time frame within which they see eliminativism operating. Many political 
conservatives and critics o f multiculturalism (e.g., D’Souza, “One-Dropof-Blood-Rule”; 
Webster, Racialization o f America) seek the immediate elim ination of ‘race’ talk because 
they view it as quite harmful. More liberal skeptics, like Appiah, tend to wish that the 
significance attached to racial classification will decline over time (and perhaps ultimately 
disappear). Theorists also differ regarding the dom ains within which they endorse or 
reject the use of ‘race’ talk. For example, Appiah is relatively comfortable with the term 
‘race’ being used in some discourses o f population genetics, bu t he would like its impor­
tance decreased in m arking social identity. See K. Anthony Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity: 
M isunderstood Connections,” in Color Conscious: The Political Morality o f Race, ed. K. Anthony
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Connecting these two issues—the metaphysics of race and the per­
missibility or desirability of ‘race’ talk—requires some argument. While 
some thinkers argue directly from, for example, genetic or social facts 
to conclusions about the existence or nonexistence of race, there is no 
direct entailment between the metaphysical facts and particular prac­
tices of ‘race’ talk. Recognizing this, recent discussions in race theory 
have employed a venerable strategy to connect metaphysical facts with 
word or concept use.8 This semantic strategy connects metaphysical claims 
and linguistic-conceptual practices with the assumption of a particular 
theory of reference for the word or concept involved.9 Schematically, 
the arguments proceed in three steps:
First, there is the metaphysical assumption that the world has such 
and such metaphysical features.
Then, there is the semantic assumption that some or another 
particular theory of reference is correct for racial terms or concepts.
Finally, it is concluded that racial terms or concepts appropriately 
refer (or fail to refer) to some or o ther metaphysical features of the 
world.
Theorists employing the semantic strategy generate different conclu­
sions about the referents of ‘race’ talk ju st in case they disagree about 
the metaphysical features of the world or they disagree about the ap­
propriate theory of reference for race term s/concepts.
In this article I argue for three conclusions:
1. Much of the apparent metaphysical disagreement over race is 
an illusion. Skeptics, constructionists, and naturalists share a broad base 
of agreem ent regarding the metaphysical facts surrounding racial or 
racialized phenom ena that suggests their views are complementary parts 
of a complex view incorporating biological, social, and psychological 
facts.
2. The appearance of a substantial metaphysical dispute is sus­
tained by the use of the semantic strategy, in particular, by different
Appiah and Amy Guttm ann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 30-105. 
Ronald Sundstrom  agrees with Appiah that the policing of racial identity can be oppressive, 
but he also argues for the value of using ‘race’ talk to pick out racial properties (conceived 
as social constructions) in understanding generalizations in the social sciences. See Sund­
strom, “Racial Nominalism,” 193-210.
8. For example, Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity”; Joshua Glasgow, “O n the New 
Biology of Race ” Journal o f Philosophy 100 (2003): 456-74; Kitcher, “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, 
C ulture”; Mills, Blackness Visible, Zack, Race and M ixed Race, and Philosophy o f Science and  
Race.
9. Here I describe appeal to a theory of reference as the “semantic” strategy. If you 
prefer to distinguish the theory of reference from semantics, feel free to think of it as 
the “reference strategy.”
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assumptions about the appropriate theory of rcfcrcncc for racc terms 
or conccpts.10
3. The semantic strategy is problematic. Racc theory ought no t to 
rely on finding the correct theory of rcfcrcncc to determ ine the ap­
propriate use of ‘racc’ talk.
H ere’s how I procccd. In Scction I, I discuss the now widely rc- 
jee ted  view callcd racialism—the view that there arc racial csscnccs. 
T hen in Sections II, III, and IV, I discuss racial skepticism, construc­
tionism, and population naturalism  in turn, explaining in cach ease 
how the metaphysical argum ents hinge on specific (and sometimes 
implicit) assumptions about the theory of rcfcrcncc appropriate to 
racial terms. While these views seem to offer sharply contrasting ac­
counts of the ontological character of racc or racial phenom ena, in 
Scction V, I argue that skepticism, constructionism, and naturalism 
about racc arc com patible parts of a single metaphysical picture of 
racializcd phenom ena, and I skctch this broad basis of agreem ent. I 
go on to suggest that this broad agreem ent goes largely unrecognized 
bccausc of semantic disagreem ents over the use of racial terms and 
conccpts considered in Sections II, III, and IV. In Scction VI, I con- 
cludc that the semantic strategy ought to be abandoned in racc theory. 
Disputes over ‘racc’ talk should be resolved by a complcx evaluation 
of a host of practical, normative considerations.
I. THE ONTOLOGICAL CONSENSUS: THE REJECTION 
OF RACIALISM
Historically, the view that racc is a natural kind has been associated with 
a belief in racial csscnccs, a view K. Anthony Appiah calls racialism. It 
is the view that “wc could divide hum an beings into a small num ber of 
groups, callcd ‘raccs,’ in such a way that the members of these groups 
shared ccrtain fundamental, heritable, physical, moral, intellectual, and 
cultural characteristics with one another that they did no t share with 
members of any other racc.”" In short, raccs were believed to share 
biobehavioral csscnccs: underlying natural (and perhaps gcnctic) prop­
erties that (1) arc heritable, biological features, (2) arc shared by all 
and only the members of a racc, and (3) explain behavioral, charac-
10. Ile re  I am developing earlier argum ents in Andreasen, ‘‘A New Perspective,” and 
‘‘Race: Biological Reality o r Social Construct?”; Ron Mallon and Stephen P. Stich, ‘I  he 
Odd Couple: The Compatibility of Social Construction and Evolutionary Psychology,” 
Philosophy o f Science 67 (2000): 135-54; and Ron Mallon, ‘‘Passing, Traveling, and Reality: 
Social Construction and the Metaphysics of Race,” Nous 38 (2004): 644-73.
11. Appiah, ‘‘Race, Culture, Identity,” 54.
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tcrological, and cultural predispositions of individual persons and racial 
groups.12
While there remains substantial disagreem ent about whether racial 
classifications might be useful in, for example, mcdical diagnosis, there 
is now widespread agreem ent am ong philosophers, social theorists, an­
thropologists, and biologists that raccs do not share such biobchavioral 
essences.13 A variety of reasons have played a role in this agreement. 
Perhaps the most prom inent rests on studies of intragroup and inter­
group genetic variation.14 Over time, belief in racial csscnccs came to 
be interpreted within the framework of m odern m olecular biology as a 
belief in underlying genetic difference, for only genes seemed appro­
priate candidates to play such an explanatory role. But studies of hum an 
genetic diversity suggest that genetic variation within racially identified 
populations is as great as or greater than diversity between populations. 
Thus, it is very unlikely that any interesting genetic “essence” will be 
shared by all and only members of a racc. Because the rejection of 
racialism is now nearly universal am ong academic racial theorists, I call 
it the ontological consensus. In what follows, I and all the authors I discuss 
take this ontological consensus for granted.
II. RACIAL SKEPTICISM
The ontological consensus holds that racial csscnccs do not exist. Racial 
skeptics think that this entails a further conclusion: that racc docs not 
exist. While skepticism is as old as racialism, I will focus on two prom ­
12. Racial theorists should want som ething stronger than the rejection of racial es­
sences. They should want to reject the claim that race is an interesting or useful biobe- 
havioral kind (a kind linking biology with behavior) o f any sort. Because nonessentialist 
accounts of races are compatible with m em bers of the race instantiating a biobehavioral 
kind that supports generalizations, the rejection of racialism on the grounds that there 
are no racial essences is too weak (Ron Mallon, “Hum an Categories beyond Nonessen- 
t ia l i s m Journal o f Political Philosophy [forthcom ing]). I ignore these complications here.
13. For debate over the continued usefulness of racial classification in scientific or 
medical endeavors, see, e.g., Nature Genetics 36, suppl. (2004).
14. This sort of argum ent is employed by, e.g., Andreasen, “A New Perspective,” 206; 
Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity,” 68; D’Souza, “One-Drop-of-Blood Rule”; Kitcher, “Race, 
Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” 87-88; Zack, Race and Mixed Race, 13-15; and it is rooted in 
pioneering work done in hum an genetics in the 1970s by M. Nei and A. K. Roychoudhury, 
Richard Lewontin, and others. See M. Nei and A. K. Roychoudhury, “Gene Differences 
between Caucasian, Negro, and Japanese Populations,” Science 177 (1972): 434-36, and 
“Genetic Variation within and between the Three Major Races of Man, Caucasoids, Ne­
groids, and Mongoloids,” American Journal o f H um an Genetics 26 (1974): 421-43; Richard 
Lewontin, “The A pportionm ent o f Hum an Diversity” in Evolutionary Biology, vol. 6, ed. I . 
Dobzhansky M. K. Hecht, and W. C. Steer (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1972), 
381-98.
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inent philosophical versions of skepticism, those provided by Appiah 
and Naomi Zack.15
Appiah recognizes that his argum ent connecting the absence of 
racial essences to the claim that ‘race’ does no t refer requires an account 
of what it is for a term or concept to refer. He groups views on reference 
according to the two dom inant philosophical traditions of understand­
ing reference. He calls these two traditions the ideational account and 
the referential account.16 His strategy is to argue that, according to either 
tradition, racial terms and concepts fail to refer.
Appiah’s ‘ideational’ label groups together the variety of descriptivist 
theories of reference. While the specifics of such views may vary, des­
criptivist views hold that:
D l: A term or concept is associated with a description: a propo­
sition or set of propositions about the properties of the referent.
D2: The term  or concept refers to the unique thing that satisfies 
(or best satisfies) the elements of the description.
D3: If no unique thing satisfies the elements of the description, 
the term  or concept does not refer.
Descriptivist theories of reference have a distinguished philosophical 
history, playing an im portant role in num erous philosophical discus­
sions.17 They also underlie discussions in the philosophy of race, in­
cluding Zack’s investigation of racial concepts. Appiah and Zack both 
agree that the description associated with ordinary terms and concepts 
is committed to racialism.18 But, as we noted above, the ontological 
consensus is that there are no racial essences. Thus, by D3, there are
15. Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity”; Zack, Race and Mixed Race, and Philosophy o f  
Science and Race.
16. Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity,” 3411'.
17. For example, in the philosophy of mind, analytic functionalists have argued that 
m ental state terms pick out those physical states that uniquely satisfy most (or the most 
im portant) of the “platitudes” o f comm onsense psychology. See David Lewis, “How to 
Define Theoretical Terms,” journa l o f Philosophy 67 (1970): 426-46, and “Psychophysical 
and Theoretical Identifications,” Australasian Journal o f Philosophy 50 (1972): 249-58. Eli- 
minativists like Stephen Stich and Paul C hurchland have assumed som ething like such 
functionalism and gone on to argue that since noth ing in fact satisfies the folk conception 
of beliefs, ordinary m ental terms do no t refer. See Stephen Stich, From Folk Psychology lo 
Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MU' Press, 1982); Paul C hurchland, “Eliminative Ma­
terialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” Journal o f Philosophy 77 (1981): 67-90. Compare 
William G. Lycan, Judgement and Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988); and Stephen P. Stich, “Deconstructing the Mind,” in Deconstructing the M ind  (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3-91.
18. Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity,” 38-71; Zack, Race and Mixed Race, 11. Some 
psychological evidence also suggests that people conceive of race in essentialist (although 
no t necessarily biologically essentialist) terms. See Lawrence Ilirschl'eld, Race in the M aking  
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Books, 1996).
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no races. In Zack’s words: “The ordinary concept of race in the United 
States has no scientific basis.”19
The hegemony of the descriptivist theory of reference has been 
overturned in recent decades, and many philosophers now believe the 
theory to be mistaken for reasons made famous by the work of Saul 
Kripke and Hilary Putnam .20 Both argue that a description associated 
with a term may be satisfied by a kind of thing that we would nonetheless 
not consider to be in the extension of the term .21 More importantly for 
present purposes, they think it is possible for a kind term  to refer to a 
kind of thing, even if the thing does not satisfy a description associated 
with the term. As Kripke explains: “A priori, all we can say is that it is 
an empirical m atter whether the characteristics originally associated with 
the kind apply to its members universally or even ever.”22 The alternative 
Kripke and Putnam offer is a causal-historical theory of reference (what 
Appiah calls a “referential” account). We can characterize causal-historical 
theories of reference as holding that:
CHI: A kind term is introduced to pick out some unified kind of 
thing.
CH2: If the term successfully picks out a kind when introduced, it 
continues to pick out that same kind as the term  is passed on to others 
(regardless of w hether or not the thing satisfies the description asso­
ciated with the term ).
CH3: If there is no single kind of thing successfully picked out by 
the term, the term does not refer.
While descriptivist theories refer via a satisfaction relationship between 
the referent and the elements of the description, causal-historical the­
ories refer in virtue of a causal-historical link between the original use 
of the term to identify a kind and later uses. W hen introduced, a kind 
term picks out the underlying property or properties that “give the best 
causal explanation of the central features of uses of that word.”23 Causal- 
historical theories have been im portant to the possibility of a realistic
19. Zack, Race and Mixed Race, 18.
20. Saul Kripke, Nam ing and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1972); Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘M eaning,’” in his M ind, Language, and Reality: 
Philosophical Papers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 215-71.
21. Perhaps the most famous example of this is Putnam ’s case of a water-like substance 
with a different chemical structure (XYZ) on Twin Earth. Despite satisfying the description 
associated with ‘water’, Putnam  argues that XYZ is not water because it has a different 
chemical structure.
22. Kripke, Nam ing and Necessity, 137.
23. Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity,” 39. A causal-historical approach to reference 
has been adopted and defended by num erous authors, e.g., Lycan, Judgement and Justifi­
cation', Paul Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
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construal of science, because they allow for the possibility that persons 
might be referring to the same kind (via a causal-historical link) despite 
having very different (and mistaken) associated descriptions.24 Applied 
to the case of race, such theories suggest the possibility that racial terms 
might refer to something other than a biological essence, even if peopleo o o 7 1 1
once believed races were characterized by essences. If so, we would 
conclude from the ontological consensus not that race does not exist 
but rather that races do exist, although people have had very mistaken 
(because essentialist) views about what races are.
If a causal-historical theory of reference is correct, we must ask 
whether there are candidates to serve as the referents of racial terms 
and concepts. Of the two possibilities Appiah considers, the one relevant 
to our present discussion suggests that ordinary ‘race’ talk may pick out 
biological populations.20 As we explore more fully in Section IV, m odern 
biological thinking is dom inated by antiessentialist accounts of biolog­
ical taxa characterized as populations. Such populations are character­
ized relationally by virtue of features of the entire population and, im­
portantly, the feature of reproductive isolation. Such reproductive isolation 
(or lack of interbreeding) is biologically im portant because it indicates 
a barrier to gene flow and carries the potential for the biological dif­
ferentiation of the populations. If racial populations are isolated in this 
way, then they may be candidates for the referents of racial terms and 
concepts.
Both Appiah and Zack reject the view that races might be repro­
ductively isolated hum an groups, because they are skeptical that there 
are contem porary groups that have the requisite reproductive isola­
tion.26 In her earlier Race and Mixed Race, Zack goes further, suggesting 
that “many biologists and anthropologists are skeptical of the concept 
of race as a useful scientific tool because no racial population, past or 
present, has ever been completely isolated from other races in terms of 
breeding.”27 Zack is correct that many scientists are skeptical of the race 
concept, but note the very strong condition of reproductive “complete 
isolation” that she imposes for biological populations. As we see below
24. For example, Richard Boyd, “Confirmation, Semantics, and the Interpretation of 
Scientific Theories,” in The Philosophy of Science, ed. Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J.
D. Trout (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
25. Appiah also considers the suggestion that racial terms may refer to persons sharing 
sets of superficial properties prototypically linked to race—including hair type, skin color, 
and body morphology. The proposal is that rather than a “thick,” racialist set of features, 
persons classified by racial terms share only a th inner and not biologically explanatory 
set of features. While some do defend such thin accounts of race, I know of no defenses 
of them  as referential candidates for causal-historical uses of race terms.
26. Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity,” 72-73; Zack, Race and Mixed Race, 15.
27. Zack, Race and Mixed Race, 15.
Mallon ‘Race’ 533
in Scction V, philosophers of biology wish to insist on a m uch weaker 
criterion of relative isolation. Appiah, and Zack in her more rcccnt 
Philosophy o f Science and Race, arc more sympathetic to the claim that 
such relative isolation m ight be found among some hum an populations. 
Nonetheless, Appiah notes that “it is no t at all plausible to claim that 
any social subgroup in the United States is such a population.”28 Zack 
agrees, noting that she continues to worry that socially or folk-identified 
raccs “may contain members who arc descendants of o ther races."'"'
Zack and Appiah offer what wc can call mismatch arguments.30 A 
mismatch argum ent holds that the true account of the extension of a 
term or concept x would be sharply different from what is believed 
about the extension of x. In this case of race, Appiah and Zack think 
that the fact of the absence of reproductive isolation am ong major racial 
groups (as identified in ordinary discourse) would result in none of 
them  being raccs (in the sense of being biological populations).31 Thus, 
if wc allowed that the term ‘race’ docs pick out biological populations, 
it would turn  out that none of the groups commonsensically considered 
raccs arc raccs. Conversely, o ther groups that arc not thought of as raccs 
(e.g., Appiah suggests the Amish, and Zack, Irish Protestants) might 
count as races.32 Because such a mismatch would frustrate the ordinary 
intentions guiding the use of racial terms, a mismatch argum ent might 
support the abandonm ent of such terms. Let’s call a situation in which 
the actual extension of a term is sharply at odds with its putative ex­
tension an extensional mismatch. Appiah and Zack thus endorse exten- 
sional mismatch arguments. Appiah also suggests that such a referential 
candidate would not “be m uch good for explaining social or psycho­
logical life,” suggesting a different sort of mismatch argum ent.33 Here 
the complaint is that while ordinary use of racial terms implies the social 
and psychological im portance of the groups those terms pick out, there 
is no reason to expect biological populations to have this sort of im­
portance. There is thus an import mismatch between such a referential 
candidate and ordinary views of race. Both objections arc based on the 
concern that there is a mismatch between what ordinary users expect 
out of racial concepts and what they get.34
28. Appiah, ‘‘Race, Culture, Identity,” 73.
29. Zack, Philosophy o f Science and Race, 76.
BO. Ibid. Appiah thinks these mismatch argum ents show that the putative referent 
violates what he calls ‘‘the adequacy condition” which requires that “some o f what was 
thought to be true of what [a term] denoted must be at least approximately true o f [the 
referential candidate]” (‘‘Race, Culture, Identity,” 40).
31. Appiah, ‘‘Race, Culture, Identity,” 73; Zack, Philosophy o f Science and Race, 77.
32. Appiah, ‘‘Race, Culture, Identity,” 73; Zack, Philosophy o f Science and Race, 69.
33. Appiah, ‘‘Race, Culture, Identity,” 74.
34. Glasgow’s, ‘‘On the New Biology” also employs mismatch argum ents against pop­
ulation accounts o f race.
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Cast in terms of the semantic strategy, Appiah and Zack begin with 
metaphysical assumptions about the failure of racialism and other facts 
about contemporary groups labeled as raccs. They then assume partic­
ular versions of dcscriptivist and causal-historical theories that, together 
with these metaphysical assumptions, entail that ‘racc’ docs not refer, 
and so they concludc that racc docs not exist.
III. RACIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM
Like their skeptical opponents, racial constructionists infer from the 
failure of racialism that racc is not a biological kind. But unlike racial 
skcptics, racial constructionists seek to develop an account on which 
racc docs exist bu t is a socially constructed kind of thing. A concisc 
statem ent of this research agenda comcs from Charles Mills, who writes 
of the need to “make a plausible social ontology neither csscntialist, 
innate, nor transhistorical, bu t real enough for all that.”35 Construc­
tionist theorists typically worry that racial skepticism leaves something 
causally or socially im portant out or, worse, that in the hands of political 
conservatives, it plays into the hands of a political agenda aimed at 
preventing racial justicc.36 Just what is left out is something about which 
constructionists differ. Some, like Outlaw, believe that socially con­
structed racial categories do and should form the basis of morally and 
socially im portant communities. Others, like Mills, Michacl Root, and 
Ronald Sundstrom, seem m ore conccrncd that wc understand racc as 
real, bccausc wc need to understand the causal role of racc in the 
world.37 Here, I consider three quite different sorts of constructionist 
theory that give substancc to this general constructionist aim in different 
ways— thin constructionism,, interactive kind constructionism, and institutional 
constructionism—and then I will discuss different assumptions construc­
tionists make about the rcfcrcncc of racial terms.
A. Three Kinds of Constructionism
Some constructionists think thatw c may wclcomc the failure of racialism 
while nonetheless using ‘racc’ talk to refer to persons in virtue of su­
perficial properties that arc prototypically linked with racc. This char­
35. Mills, Blackness Visible, xiv.
36. Outlaw, “Toward a Critical Theory of ‘Race,’” “Oo W. E. B. DuBois,” and On Race 
and Philosophy; Mills, Blackness Visible; Omi and Winant, Racial Formation; Root, ‘ Ilow We 
Divide the World”; Sundstrom, “Racial Nominalism”; Taylor, “Appiah’s Uncom pleted Ar­
gum ent.” Sundstrom  makes explicit the worry about political conservatives.
37. I in terpret the varieties o f constructionism I discuss here as what Robin Andreasen 
has called “local” constructionist theses (“A New Perspective,” 217). Local constructionists 
may claim that a thing or certain things or certain kinds o f things are socially constructed, 
and they contrast with global constructionists who m aintain that everything is a social 
construction.
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acterizes a certain strand of Mills’s account that I will call thin construc­
tionism,3S Mills proceeds via conceptual analysis to understand the 
criteria ordinary people use to ascribe racial membership, listing bodily 
appearance, ancestry, self-awareness of ancestry, public awareness of an­
cestry, culture, experience, and self-identification as all relevant, and he 
suggests that we can make sense of the objectivity of racial membership 
by appeal to such criteria implicit in the application of the ordinary 
concept.39 Mills’s account is a ‘th in ’ account because it classifies persons 
into races on the basis of superficial features of their body and ancestry. 
It is ‘constructionist’ in the sense that it holds that such features are 
not of independent epistemological interest (as they would be if they 
were causally im portant) bu t of interest only because a community’s 
conceptual practice makes them  so.40
It is clear that some constructionists want more than thin construc­
tionism. They want a theory on which one’s race entails im portant facts 
about a person within a particular context. A plausible route for iden­
tifying such an account begins with the recognition that racial classifi­
cation of persons has causal effects on the person and proceeds to 
suggest that racial terms designate persons in virtue of a particular sort 
o f causal interaction between a person and the racial labels and concepts 
they fall under. Following Ian Hacking, we can call this interactive kind 
constructionism.41 Various sorts of interactive kind accounts are distin­
guished by the various sorts of causal consequences they emphasize. For 
example, Adrian Piper writes, “W hat joins me to o ther blacks, then, and 
o ther blacks to [one] another, is not a set of shared physical charac­
teristics, for there is none that all blacks share.”42 Rather, Piper goes on 
to assert, blacks are jo ined  by “the shared experience of being visually 
or cognitively identified as black by a white racist society, and the pu­
nitive and damaging effects of that identification.”43 Piper’s account 
suggests a general understanding of race, that people are members of 
a race R insofar as they have R-typical experiences caused by racial 
labeling. But notice that such experiences are only possible in a society 
in which persons are causally affected by the racial labels they fall under.
38. Mills, Blackness Visible. This reading ignores certain ambiguities in Mills’s account. 
See Mallon, “Passing, Traveling, and Reality,” sec. 2, for a m ore developed discussion.
39. Mills, Blackness Visible, 50ff.
40. For example, Mills writes that ancestry is “crucial not because it necessarily man­
ifests itself in biological racial traits but simply, tautologously, because it is taken to be 
crucial, because there is an intersubjective ag reem en t. . .  to classify individuals in a certain 
way on the basis of known ancestry” (Blackness Visible, 58).
41. Ian I lacking, The Social Construction o f What? (Cambridge, MA: I larvard University 
Press, 1999).
42. Piper, “Passing for White, Passing for Black,” 30.
43. Ibid., 30-31.
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A third sort of constructionism, defended by Root, holds that race 
is a variety of social fact or institution. Understanding race by reference 
to social institutions seems promising, for social institutions seem to 
have many features that constructionists wish to impute to race: they 
arc culturally and historically local, they arc relationally and socially 
produced, and they arc causally powerful. The idea behind such an 
account is that wc require that in order for something to be an instance 
of a kind k, it must be in a community in which people regard it as 
falling under the related concept K. Root writes: “Where R is a race, a 
person is R at a site only if R is used there to divide people. Because 
the ancient Greeks did not divide people by race, there were no raccs 
in Athens.”44 While interactive accounts emphasize the causal effects of 
labeling, institutional accounts of race hold that labeling is conceptually 
or logically required. And the hope is that wc can understand race as 
an im portant, efficacious, bu t socially constructed social institution.
B. Constructionism and Reference
These three forms of constructionism offer accounts of race on which 
racial terms pick out groups of persons in virtue of either superficial 
or culturally local features (or both). However, in the last section, wc 
saw that Appiah’s and Zack’s arguments for racial skepticism seem to 
preclude constructionist racial terms being used in this way, on pain of 
their being a mismatch between beliefs associated with the term and its 
referent. If their arguments for racial skepticism arc correct, then race 
docs no t exist. Skeptics would then be right to insist that to continue 
to use racial terms that (properly construed) refer to nothing is to 
engage in an im proper and misleading linguistic practice.
How m ight constructionists reply to the semantic strategy as em­
ployed by skeptics? The logic of the semantic strategy suggests that they 
can dispute either the metaphysical details reviewed by Appiah and Zack 
or the semantic assumptions entailing that ‘race’ docs not refer. But 
because social constructionists agree with skeptics about the failure of 
racialism, they choose the latter strategy. Mills’s thin constructionist 
account offers one possibility for such a defense. Mills suggests that wc 
can understand racial terms as applying to persons in virtue of the 
criteria implicit in the folk account of race, and the natural way to 
understand his account is as an application of a descriptivist theory of 
reference. He considers a series of hypothetical cases to arrive at the 
criteria central to ordinary racial ascription, and he suggests that raccs 
arc the groups of persons that satisfy these criteria. As wc have seen, 
Zack and Appiah would reply that the ordinary use of racial terms arises 
out of a history of racialism, and so racialist implications arc part of the
44. Root, ‘i lo w  We Divide the World,” S632.
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description associated with ordinary racial terms and conccpts. However, 
it seems open to Mills to insist that one may use racial terms and conccpts 
shorn of their racialist implications or, to pu t it another way, that racialist 
theories have been associated with racial terms and conccpts but arc 
not essential to their application.
Paul Taylor offers a more explicit criticism of Appiah’s choicc of a 
description.45 For Appiah and Zack, racial descriptions entail racialism, 
but Taylor suggests that the racial conccpt operating in the work of W. 
E. B. DuBois offers a historical example of a description without racialist 
implications46—a description on which raccs arc “socio-cultural ob­
jects.”47 On Taylor’s account, some racial descriptions (namely, Du­
Bois’s) associated with racial terms may be satisfied by the objccts pro­
duced by the causal interaction of persons and racial labels and 
conccpts, and hc presses Appiah with the question, “Why can’t wc ju st 
say that the processes of racial identification and ascription bring raccs 
into being?”48
Constructionists thus resist the skeptical conclusion by resisting the 
semantic premise of the semantic strategy. In particular, both Mills and 
Taylor arc prepared to assume a dcscriptivist theory of reference, but 
they offer alternate accounts of what is in the description associated 
with racial terms.49 How wc proceed from here is a question wc will 
return to below, after wc have considered a third metaphysical option: 
population naturalism.
45. Taylor, “Appiah’s Uncom pleted A rgum ent.”
46. There is ongoing dispute about whether DuBois really succeeds in avoiding a 
com m itm ent to racialism. Compare Appiah, “Uncom pleted Argum ent”; Oudaw, “O n W.
E. B. DuBois”; and Taylor, “Appiah’s Uncom pleted A rgum ent.”
47. That is ‘racialism’ as I have used the term: a view that entails the existence of 
biobehavioral racial essences. Taylor employs the term differently, to label the construc­
tionist position he attributes to DuBois—a position that is realist but no t essentialist about 
race.
48. Taylor, “Appiah’s Uncom pleted A rgum ent,” 122.
49. A nother possibility for answering Appiah’s skeptical argum ent would be to insist 
that a constructionist account provides a referential candidate for a causal-historical ap­
proach to racial terms. As far as I know, no constructionists have ever pursued this pos­
sibility. Perhaps this is because constructionists believe that causal-historical theories are 
incompatible with socially produced institutions and artifacts (as does Amie Thomasson, 
“Realism and H um an Kinds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 [2003]: 580-609). 
However, Taylor’s suggestion of a history of employing racial terms to pick out “socio­
cultural objects” suggests the possibility that such objects m ight also figure as referents in 
a causal-historical approach. In order to develop this suggestion, we would want an account 
of how these sociocultural objects m ight figure as stable kinds. For an attem pt at such an 
account, see Ron Mallon, “Social Construction, Social Roles, and Stability,” in Socializing 
Metaphysics, ed. Frederick Schmitt (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 327-53.
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IV. RACIAL POPULATION NATURALISM
Racial skcptics and constructionists take the ontological consensus to 
show that race is not natural. Robin Andreasen and Philip Kitcher de­
fend the claim that racial naturalism is compatible with the rejection 
of racialism.30 These theorists insist that from the fact that there are no 
racial essences, it does not follow that race is not a natural kind. In 
particular, they defend the claim that races may be biological popula­
tions characterized by at least some im portant degree of reproductive 
isolation. The qualifier ‘may’ is appropriate, because Andreasen and 
Kitcher each express reservations about whether races (as ordinarily 
identified) are biological populations of the appropriate sort, and like 
those of Appiah and Zack, these reservations stem from a concern about 
whether contem porary populations exhibit the appropriate reproduc­
tive isolation.
Because claims asserting a biological basis of race have cyclically 
served as premises in arguments attem pting to legitimate oppressive 
social attitudes and policies, we ought to be very careful in discussing 
such claims.31 For this reason, I begin by arguing that racial population 
naturalism ought not to be confused with racialism. I go on to discuss 
the particular views of Andreasen and Kitcher, and I assess these views 
in light of the critiques of Appiah and Zack.
The shift to population thinking in biology is no t merely compatible 
with the rejection of racialism. Rather, the shift to population thinking 
about species has been driven by a rejection of precisely the sort of 
essentialist thinking in biology that racialism represents. Common sense 
conceives both species and races as having underlying essences, but the 
existence of such essences is now widely rejected.32 In the case of species, 
this rejection has occurred in tandem  with a shift to thinking about 
evolution in terms of biological populations. The result has been a family 
of views of species that allow us to understand how a diverse group of 
organisms exhibiting considerable variation at both the genotypic and 
phenotypic levels could operate as an evolutionary unit. Racial popu­
lation naturalists suggest that a similar argum ent can be made in the 
context of race. Thus, the rejection of racialism and the adoption of 
population thinking about race are theoretically linked in just the way 
that the rejection of biological essentialism and population level views 
of species are linked.
50. Andreasen, “A New Perspective,” and “Race: Biological Reality o r Social Con­
struct?”; Kitcher, “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture.”
51. But note also that constructionist opponents of racial skepticism worry that the 
absence of a biological basis o f race is also used to legitimate unfavorable social policies.
52. Frank Keil, Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development (Cambridge, MA: MU’ Press,





Population thinking means identifying relevant biological groups 
by features of entire populations rather than individuals. One way of 
emphasizing the profound shift of orientation signaled by such thinking 
is to note that it is conceptually possible that distinct, reproductively 
isolated populations (either at the species level or at the subspecies 
level) have no genotypic or phenotypic differences at all.53 Because 
populations are defined relationally, intrinsic features of individual or­
ganisms are not central to such biological classification.
Andreasen defends the view that we can understand hum an pop­
ulations as divisible into subspecies along cladistic lines. Cladism is a 
school of biological taxonomy that organizes biological populations into 
a phylogenetic “tree” indicating ancestor and descendent relations. (See 
fig. 1.) If accurately produced, a phylogenetic tree indicates genuine 
genealogical relationships am ong populations, providing an objective 
basis for taxonomic division.34 Cladistic taxonomy grounds taxonomic 
categories by classifying monophyletic portions of the tree (portions in­
cluding a population and all its descendent populations). Traditionally, 
phylogenetic trees are constructed with branching points (A and B in 
fig. 1) representing speciation events. There are a variety of accounts 
of ju st what a speciation event is, but typically they involve at least the 
division of a population into two daughter populations exhibiting re­
productive isolation.55
Cladistic taxonomy traditionally identifies species with the mono­
phyletic segments of such a phylogenetic tree (e.g., AC, AB, BD, and BE  
in  fig. 1). Andreasen extends the traditional account of cladistic tax-
53. Andreasen (“Race: Biological Reality o r  Social Construct?” S664-S665) makes a 
similar point but to different effect.
54. Taxonomic divisions at the superspecies level are objective insofar as they represent 
monophyletic portions o f the tree, but o th er questions rem ain open (e.g., how many and 
which m onophyletic portions o f the complete tree ought to be taxonomically identified). 
See Andreasen, “A New Perspective,” for fu rther discussion.
55. See Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths, Sex and Death: An Introduction to Philosophy o f 
Biology (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1999), chap. 9, for an overview o f the ongoing 
debate over species concepts.
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onomy to the subspecies level, arguing that a phylogenetic tree can be 
constructed tracing the genealogical relationships of hum an popula­
tions (again characterized as exhibiting reproductive isolation). O n An- 
dreasen’s view, such populations were hum an raccs. But while An- 
dreasen believes that such hum an raccs once existed, she allows that 
racial terms may fail to refer to populations in the contem porary United 
States since the m odern world has brought “the intermixing of isolated 
populations and the gradual dissolution of racial distinctness,” resulting 
in a situation in which raccs “arc on their way out.”56 Andreasen’s positive 
thesis is thus strictly a claim about the historical existence of hum an 
raccs. She believes that hum an raccs once existed, bu t she is agnostic 
about whether they do any longer.57
Philip Kitcher offers an account similar to Andreasen’s. Like An- 
dreasen, Kitcher understands raccs as a certain sort of reproductively 
isolated population lineage. However, Kitcher’s account differs from 
Andreasen’s in key ways. Andreasen argues that racial populations may 
exist as clades or monophyletic segments of a phylogenetic tree that 
reconstructs the evolutionary history of humanity. In contrast, Kitcher 
suggests that wc can choose what hc calls ‘founder populations’ “as wc 
please, gerrym andering [them] as wc fancy” as long as certain additional 
conditions arc m et to ensure that the population lineage wc end up 
with is biologically significant.58 So, while both Andreasen and Kitcher 
think ‘race’ talk could pick out reproductively isolated population lin­
eages, Andreasen’s lineages arc of a special sort: they arc monophyletic 
segments of the phylogenetic tree reconstructing the history of hum an­
ity.59 Kitcher’s proposal allows that races may be such clades, bu t they 
may also be what Ernst Mayr called “non-dimensional” populations that 
are reproductively isolated only at the present m om ent.60 Because non- 
dimensional populations may disappear before playing an evolutionary 
role, they might never become clades. Andreasen’s and Kitcher’s pro­
posals thus represent different requirem ents of the am ount of time a 
population must be reproductively isolated to be relevant (see fig. 2).61
Perhaps because Andreasen’s cladistic proposal is m ore highly con­
strained by evolutionary relevance than Kitcher’s comparatively prag­
matic groupings, Kitcher is far more optimistic that contem porary racial 
groups comprise biological populations. Kitcher proceeds by marshaling
56. Andreasen, “A New Perspective,” 200.
57. Andreasen, “Race: Biological Reality o r Social Construct?” S659 n. 4.
58. Kitcher, “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” 94.
59. The discussion draws on A ndreasen’s own account of the differences between the 
two views (“Race: Biological Reality or Social Construct?” S659 n. 4).
60. Kitcher, “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” 102.
61. Although, presumably, the reason to be interested in nondim ensional racial pop­
ulations is that they may give rise to longer-lasting evolutionarily im portant clades.
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Fig. 2.—Populations over time
evidence on racial intermarriage suggesting that, in the contemporary 
United States, black-white interm arriage rates arc quite low. As Kitcher 
notes, such evidence must be interpreted very carefully, for the data arc 
quite limited, and they may not indicate genuine reproductive isola­
tion.® Moreover, the limited data that Kitcher relies on may no longer 
be (or may come to no longer be) true of contem porary U.S. popula­
tions.63 For these reasons, Kitcher offers the somewhat tentative con­
clusion that “divisions into raccs might have biological significance” in 
the contem porary United States.64 An interesting feature of Kitcher’s 
account is that it shows how a purely arbitrary system of cultural clas­
sification m ight create populations of genuine biological significance. 
The mere fact that in contem porary America people employ racial di­
visions in deciding with whom to bear children could be enough to 
produce an im portant biological kind.60
A. Populations and Reproductive Isolation
How do A ndreasen’s and Kitcher’s accounts stand up against the ob­
jections posed by racial skeptics? Let’s begin with A ndreasen’s claim 
that racial terms accurately refer to hum an clades that once existed,
62. There are many complications here. These include determ ining whether marriage 
rates are a good indicator of reproductive rates between racial populations (particularly 
given the history of American chattel slavery), assessing whether there are “bridge” pop­
ulations (Kitcher [“Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” 115-16 n. 18] notes, following a 
com m ent by Gregory Trianosky-Sdlwett, that if white-I lispanic and black-I lispanic inter­
marriage rates are high, there may be no reproductive isolation), and considering how 
changes in racial designations in census reports affect such estimates.
63. More recent evidence from the U.S. Census B ureau’s C urrent Population Survey 
indicates still low but gradually increasing black-white marriage rates, while both the rate 
of marriage and its growth are h igher for I lispanic to non-I lispanic and white to nonwhite 
(mostly Asian); Rodger Doyle, “The Progress of Love,” Scientific American, October 2003, 19.
64. Kitcher, “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” 90.
65. Kitcher’s account thus presupposes the existence of the same sorts o f practices 
of racial ascription and the causal effects o f such practices typically emphasized in con­
structionist accounts (see “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” 106).
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but may no longer. A ndreasen’s claim depends on substantive readings 
of the tradition of cladism and the genetic evidence, neither of which 
I will assess here. Rather, I will restrict myself to assessing w hether the 
concerns raised by Appiah and Zack should lead us to reject Andreasen’s 
population naturalism. For Appiah, and for Zack in her recent Philosophy 
of Science and Race, the answer seems to be a clear “no.” Both allow the 
possibility that biologically relevant hum an populations m ight exist (or 
have existed), bu t both are skeptical that any current, large populations 
in the United States are races.66 Thus, they are in agreem ent with An­
dreasen about the possibility of historical, reproductively isolated hum an 
populations and express skepticism to her agnosticism about whether 
there currently are such populations.
Zack’s earlier Race and Mixed Race, in contrast, suggests that “no 
racial population, past or present, has ever been completely isolated 
from other races in terms of breeding.”67 But why should complete 
isolation be the standard? As Kitcher points out, this standard is much 
too high for the purposes of biological taxonomy, for even many species 
would no t count as reproductively isolated if it requires never inter­
breeding.68 Kitcher’s suggestion is, then, that Zack’s earlier discussion 
is simply mistaken about the relevant standard of reproductive isola­
tion.69 But it is also possible that Zack is concerned about complete 
reproductive isolation because she believes the “one-drop rule” is a 
necessary feature of the race concept “black.”'0 Such a rule infamously 
dictates that having one black ancestor is enough to make one black 
(i.e., that all the descendents of a black person are also black). If this 
rule is a necessary feature of contem porary racial taxonomy, then com­
plete reproductive isolation would be relevant for assessing racial mem­
bership (since having no black ancestors would be necessary for being 
nonblack). However, it is clear that Andreasen and Kitcher are not 
concerned to vindicate ordinary race concepts, particularly if they entail 
the one-drop rule. So, if Zack’s conceptual analysis was the source of 
her objection, then she is in a position to agree that more or less re­
productively isolated populations may once have existed, while retaining 
her view that we ought not call them  ‘races’.
The m ore contentious view is Kitcher’s claim that populations in 
the contem porary U nited States m ight count as races. Appiah, and more 
recently, Zack, are prepared to allow that the Amish or Irish Protestants
66. Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity,” 73; Zack, Philosophy o f Science and Race, 76.
67. Zack, Race and Mixed Race, 15.
68. Kitcher, “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” 95. Andreasen notes, in a similar vein, 
that “low levels o f in terbreeding can be allowed; in terbreeding is only a problem  when it 
is extensive enough to cause reticulation” (“A New Perspective,” 210).
69. Kitcher, “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” 95.
70. Zack, Race and Mixed Race, 1 Off.
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might count as races (due to their relative reproductive isolation), but 
they insist that “no large social group in America is a race.”71 So does 
Kitcher simply disagree with Appiah and Zack about the extent of re­
productive isolation? I suggest not. Instead, the argum ent seems to turn 
on disagreements about the degree of reproductive isolation required 
to fall under the concept “race,” with Kitcher holding that “clusters of 
populations are reproductively isolated from one another just in case, 
where populations in different clusters are in geographical contact, they 
interbreed only at low rates.”72 It is this standard that Kitcher suggests 
may be m et in the contem porary United States. Kitcher’s claim grows 
out of a more general argum ent that reproductive isolation (whether 
among species or subspecies groups) is not an all-or-nothing affair but 
admits of degrees.73 Kitcher’s claim, like A ndreasen’s, is thus a substan­
tive argum ent within the context of discussions of subspecies population 
groups in the philosophy of biology, and assessing it fully would take 
us well beyond the present discussion. But the present point is that 
skeptics and population naturalists do not disagree over the empirical 
rates of interm arriage or interbreeding, only on w hether the actual 
degree of reproductive isolation is sufficient to result in genuine races. 
Zack’s earlier skepticism may have been driven by her analysis of com- 
monsense race concepts. And more recent arguments by both Appiah 
and Zack that contem porary races lack the required degree of repro­
ductive isolation seem to be driven by the judgm ent that, however rates 
of interm arriage or interbreeding come out, they will be insufficient to 
vindicate the presuppositions of ordinary ‘race’ talk.74
If this reading is correct, the dispute between racial skeptics and 
population naturalists is best interpreted not as a disagreem ent over 
what rates of reproductive isolation are required for biological relevance 
or whether those rates have been achieved but as a dispute over whether 
whatever hum an populations there were or are should be labeled by 
‘race’ talk. Andreasen argues for a similar conclusion regarding the
71. Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity,” 73.
72. Kitcher, “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” 95. See also n. 68 above.
73. Thus Kitcher argues: “Long before the extremes [of reproductive isolation] are 
reached, the differences between inbreeding and outbreeding rates may be sufficient to 
preserve the genetic differences that underlie the distinct phenotypes—or, at least, sub­
stantially to retard the erosion of those differences” (“Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” 
97). See also his “Some Puzzles about Species,” in What the Philosophy of Biology Is, ed. M. 
Ruse (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 183-208.
74. This reading is supported by A ppiah’s “U ncom pleted Argum ent” that begins: 
“Contem porary biologists are no t agreed on the question of w hether there are any hum an 
races, despite the widespread scientific consensus on the underlying genetics. For most 
purposes, however, we can reasonably treat this issue as terminological. W hat most people 
in most cultures ordinarily believe about the significance o f ‘racial’ difference is quite 
remote, I think, from what the biologists are agreed o n ” (59).
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relationship of her own proposal to racial skepticism. Andreasen diag­
noses the skeptical conclusions of theorists like Appiah and Zack as 
resulting from their project of discrediting the ordinary or common- 
sense view of racc. In contrast, Andreasen sees herself (and presumably 
Kitcher) as asking w hether there is any biologically objective way to 
divide persons into raccs given that the essentialism suggested by the 
commonsense view is false.75
B. Populations and Reference
O f course, it would seem that Andreasen’s diagnosis works only if pop­
ulation naturalists can avoid skeptical arguments that racc docs not exist. 
This argument, wc saw, involves both metaphysical and semantic prem ­
ises, and here (as in the skepticism-constructionism debate) wc find the 
disagreem ent is semantic rather than metaphysical. Population natu­
ralists thus resist skepticism by offering alternative semantic assumptions.
O n the descriptivist view of reference, resisting the skeptical view 
requires offering an alternative account of the elements in the descrip­
tion that referents of racial terms must satisfy. Kitcher docs this, writing: 
“My strategy will be the inverse of one that is common in discussions 
of racc. Rather than starting with our current conceptions of racc, with 
all the baggage they carry, I want to ask how biologists employ the notion 
of racc, and how wc m ight regard our own spccics in similar fashion.”76 
Thus, while Appiah and Zack begin with the ordinary conception of 
racc (and the baggage of racialism it carries), Kitcher is concerned to 
analyze the concept of racc as it is used (or m ight be used) in contem ­
porary biology.77 Like Mills and Taylor, Kitcher employs an alternative 
description that hc believes may be satisfied by contem porary groups.
In contrast, Andreasen suggests that “the objectivity of a kind, bi­
ological or otherwise, is not called into question by the fact that ordinary 
people have mistaken beliefs about the nature of that kind” and reminds 
us that the causal-historical account of reference bears out this intui­
tion.78 Appiah, recall, thinks that populations cannot be the referent of 
a causal-historical use of ‘race’ talk, because there is both an extensional 
mismatch and an im port mismatch between population groups and
75. Andreasen, “A New Perspective,” 218.
76. Kitcher, “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” 92.
77. Kitcher’s approach thus contrasts with Appiah and Zack in the way that Putnam ’s 
“scientific functionalism ” (or “psychofunctionalism”) contrasts with the commonsense or 
analytic functionalism o f Lewis. See Hilary Putnam , “The Nature o f Mental States,” in 
Readings in Philosophy o f Psychology, vol. 1, ed. Ned Block (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni­
versity Press, 1980), 223-31; Lewis, “Ilow to Define Theoretical Terms,” and “Psycho­
physical and Theoretical Identifications”; Ned Block, “Introduction: W hat Is Functional­
ism?” in his Headings, 171-84.
78. Andreasen, “Race: Biological Reality o r Social Construct?” S662.
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racial groups. However, these mismatches arc ones that Kitchcr and 
Andreasen arc aware of and arc inclined to acccpt. That is, both Kitchcr 
and Andreasen believe that population groups of the sorts they discuss 
might deviate in im portant ways from commonscnsc views, and more­
over, neither believes such groups have the kind of explanatory im port 
common sense attributes to them. '9 They simply disagree with skeptics 
about whether such population groups could properly be callcd ‘races’.
V. EXPANDING THE ONTOLOGICAL CONSENSUS
The above authors all suggest or defend very different accounts of what 
racc is, suggesting there is a vibrant and ongoing set of metaphysical 
disagreements about whether racc exists, and if it docs, what kind of 
thing it is. But this appearance is deceptive, for it is driven in large part 
by the semantic strategy that begins with different assumptions regarding 
the correct theory of rcfcrcncc for racc terms and conccpts. Wc can 
sec this simply by reviewing these positions and the implicit or explicit 
assumptions about rcfcrcncc they can or do employ (sec table 1).
W hen wc look at the metaphysical facts, divorced from questions 
regarding the use of racial terms or conccpts, wc find a relatively broad 
range of theses that do and should com m and wide agreem ent among 
skeptics, constructionists, and naturalists. Such a restatem ent looks like 
an almost banal list of observations:
1. Racialism is false. There arc no biobchavioral racial csscnccs.
2. There arc a variety of racial conccpts in the United States that 
arc applied to persons.
3. Ordinary people employ criteria including skin color, body mor­
phology, ancestry, and identification to ascribe these conccpts to 
persons.
4. The application of these racial conccpts may causally affcct per­
sons in both superficial and profound ways.
5. Racial classification has had profoundly oppressive effects, at 
least in the past.80
6. W hether or no t biological populations now exhibit a significant 
degree of reproductive isolation, the geographic distribution of popu­
lations suggests that they once did. Such distribution is partially re­
sponsible for the geographic distribution of superficial bodily features 
associated with racc.
79. I suspect Appiah is well aware o f the limitations o f mismatch arguments, and it 
is for this reason that he stops short of concluding his discussion of referential theories 
by saying ‘‘there are no races” as he does elsewhere in the same work (e.g., “Race, Culture, 
Identity,” 38).
80. This is not to imply that racial classification has not also had positive effects, e.g., 
by fostering a sense of pride or com m on identity.
TABLE 1 
From Reference to  Metaphysics
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Metaphysical Position
Racial skepticism: races do not exist 
(e.g., Appiah and Zack).
Constructionism: races are aggre­
gates o f individuals sharing super­
ficial properties that serve as the 
criteria for a social practice of as­
cription (e.g., Mills), o r they are 
groups o f persons produced caus­
ally (e.g., Piper) o r institutionally 
(e.g., Root) by such a social 
practice.
Population naturalism: races (if any 
exist) are biological populations 
characterized by partial reproduc­
tive isolation (e.g., Andreasen and 
Kitcher).
Options for a Theory of Reference
Descriptivist: construe descriptions as en­
tailing the false theory o f racialism (Ap­
piah, Zack).
Causal historical: construe referents as 
constrained by mismatches (Appiah, 
Zack).
Descriptivist: construe descriptions as free 
o f racialism and choose a description 
satisiied by individuals that, e.g., possess 
certain superficial properties (Mills) or 
that have certain historical o r institu­
tional properties (Taylor).
Description: construe racial descriptions 
as they m ight figure in contem porary 
biological discussions of populations 
(Kitcher).
Causal historical: construe racial terms as 
picking out populations, at least in the 
past (Andreasen).
7. Among the many things that the practice of racial classification 
affects, one is marriage rates (and reproduction rates) between some 
groups of classified persons. That is, m arriage/reproductive rates be­
tween members of classified groups may be lower than m arriage/re­
productive rates within the same groups.
8. If the reproductive rates between groups arc low enough (and 
there arc no bridge populations), the groups will be distinct biological 
populations.
Further evidence that there is wide agreem ent on metaphysical 
questions but disagreement regarding the appropriateness of ‘racc’ talk 
is revealed by the attempts of racc theorists to provide an account of 
phenom ena that do not (by their lights) count as racc. For example, 
Appiah thinks raccs do not exist, but he offers an account of racial 
identification to account for the constructionist intuition that racial 
classification is causally im portant.81 While constructionists and natu­
ralists believe that raccs exist or may exist, theorists in cach tradition 
arc at pains to emphasize their agreem ent with racial skcptics that raccs
81. Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity.”
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do not exist in the sense that racialists believe they do. And skeptics 
may allow that reproduction rates am ong groups of persons classified 
as different races are lower than within those groups but insist that such 
groups do not count as races.82
If this is correct, it is mistaken to view disputes am ong construc­
tionists and naturalists as primarily metaphysical in character. Skeptics 
say race does not exist, employing the term ‘race’ to m ean something 
that everyone agrees does not exist. Constructionists insist that race does 
exist, again employing the term ‘race’ to pick out phenom ena that 
everyone agrees exist. And naturalists insist that races existed and might 
still exist, using the term ‘race’ to pick out biological populations that 
are substantially different from the kinds whose existence eliminativists 
deny.
It is a consequence of this view that for a variety of im portant 
questions of public policy and applied morality, the questions may be 
restated without im portant metaphysical disagreement within different 
idioms of ‘race’ talk. For example, skeptics who call for rectification of 
civil rights violations in twentieth-century America m ight claim that “rec­
tification is owed to those persons who have been classified as ‘black’ 
in twentieth-century America,” even though they may continue to insist 
there are no true members of a black race. In contrast, similar prorec­
tification constructionists might simply claim that “rectification is owed 
to twentieth-century American black persons.”
To say that there is no im portant metaphysical difference between 
alternate ways of speaking is not to say that there is no im portant dif­
ference at all. This is especially true of ‘race’ talk. While there are facts 
that can be equally well stated in a variety of vocabularies, the ways 
people think and talk about race matter, and these practices are sus­
ceptible to consideration and critique.
VI. AGAINST THE SEMANTIC STRATEGY
Metaphysical debates over race have employed the semantic strategy to 
resolve disputes over the true character of race. But, in the absence of 
substantial metaphysical disagreement, racial theorists have achieved 
alternative conclusions by making different assumptions about the cor­
rect semantics for racial terms. Race theorists have employed theories 
of reference in at least two different ways. O ne way, the way I have been 
attributing to Appiah,83 employs a theory or theories of reference as 
determinative of a correct answer to the question: to what (if anything) 
ought we use t to refer? But while this approach is quite common in
82. See, e.g., Glasgow, “On the New Biology,” 471.
83. This way also Figures in the practice, at least in part, of Glasgow, Kitcher, Mills, 
and Zack.
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philosophy, it is no t obligatory. Taylor, for example, docs not make such 
a claim.84 Rather, Taylor offers an account of reference that allows for 
‘race’ talk to pick out a race construed as a socially constructed object. 
This permissive employment of theories of reference offers an inter­
pretation of how a particular account of race coheres with the intuitions 
supporting a particular theory of reference, bu t it docs no t make the 
additional claim that o ther proposed referents of racial terms or con­
cepts arc disqualified on semantic grounds. If wc want to employ a theory 
of reference to decide which account of race is correct (e.g., to decide 
whether one of the metaphysical accounts in table 1 is correct), wc need 
a determinative reading of such a theory.
If pursuing the semantic strategy requires a determinative theory, 
then the task for its proponents is clear. They need only decide which 
theory of reference is correct and decide what auxiliary assumptions 
regarding the application of such a theory arc needed to determ ine the 
correct referents of racial terms and concepts.80 Alternatively, they could 
pursue Appiah’s strategy and attem pt to justify a conclusion in terms 
of every plausible theory. Let us consider each alternative.
The semantic strategy seems to offer an avenue by which to settle 
disputes between skeptics, naturalists, and constructionists once and for 
all. Nonetheless, pursuing racial phenom ena from this direction is ob­
fuscating and ineffective. It is obfuscating because, as wc have seen, it 
makes a philosophical debate over the reference of racial terms and 
concepts appear as a genuine metaphysical disagreem ent about what is 
in the world.86 It is ineffective because it is unlikely to be fruitful in 
resolving the question of how wc ought to use ‘race’ talk.
The semantic strategy makes discussions over the correct account 
of race hostage to issues in the philosophy of language and metaphysics 
about which there is little agreem ent.87 Nor is it clear that a resolution 
will ever be forthcoming. Accounts of reference arc justified by reference 
to semantic intuitions that vary from person to person and from culture
84. Andreasen may also be employing a theory o f reference in this way, as she stops 
short o f endorsing a causal-historical theory while making it clear that she thinks that the 
correct theory of reference allows for mismatches between ordinary beliefs and the real 
referents of ‘race’ talk (which she takes to be populations); “A New Perspective,” S662.
85. For example, if the descriptivist theory is the right approach, we must still make 
auxiliary assumptions about which beliefs (and whose beliefs) determ ine the description 
(e.g., A rnold’s, DuBois’s, beliefs o f contem porary folk, scientists’ beliefs, etc.). We must 
also make assumptions about how m uch of the description must be satisiied by a candidate 
for it to count as satisfying the description.
86. See also Mallon and Stich, “Odd Couple.”
87. See, e.g., nn. 16 and 23 above for some defenders of descriptivist and causal- 
historical approaches, respectively.
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to culture.88 Stephen Stich has even argued that there cannot be a res­
olution of the dispute over a correct theory of reference until there is 
agreem ent over what would count as getting it right.89 All these reasons 
suggest that approaching the metaphysics of race via finding a deter­
minative theory of reference for racial terms or concepts is unlikely to 
be fruitful.
O ne m ight think that one could escape these problems by pursuing 
Appiah’s strategy: simply argue that o n e’s conclusions follow from all 
o f the plausible candidate theories of reference. In order to do so, we 
need to be able to separate the plausible from the implausible candi­
dates. But even if we can decide on the plausible candidates, there is 
no reason to believe that all the plausible candidates converge on a 
single answer regarding w hether or how race exists. Indeed, our dis­
cussion seems to show that just the opposite is the case, for Andreasen, 
Appiah, Kitcher, Mills, Taylor, and Zack all arrive at different conclusions 
simply by suggesting different although plausible assumptions regarding 
the reference of racial terms. For example, Appiah, Kitcher, Mills, Taylor, 
and Zack all suggest different although reasonable descriptions to fix 
the referent of racial terms.
Finally, even supposing we overcame all these problems and arrived 
at a correct account of the reference of racial terms (or an account of 
the reference of such terms based on a converging set of accounts) 
yielding a definitive account of what (if anything) race is, it is not clear 
that the semantically correct account of ‘race’ talk ought to dictate our 
use. To see this, consider first that semantic arguments regarding the 
referents of ‘race’ talk need not dovetail with o ther sorts of argument. 
One might coherently hold, for example, that racial labels and concepts 
do not refer but that we should continue to use them  anvwav because 
the practical benefits are so great. O r alternatively, one might think that 
racial labels and concepts do refer but we ought not use them  because 
we risk being m isunderstood as legitimating oppression.
Once we realize the possibility of such a gap, then semantic con­
siderations seem less im portant, for it is not clear that they are of suf­
ficient im portance to outweigh other normative arguments to alternative 
conclusions. If, for example, we decide that the use of ‘race’ talk is 
deeply oppressive, no argum ent to the effect that such talk refers to a 
biological population or a social construction would be of sufficient 
weight to m erit the continuation of this practice. In contrast, if we 
decided that the use of ‘race’ talk is morally required, or carries enor­
mous epistemic benefits, skeptical arguments that racial terms do not,
88. Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen P. Stich, “Semantics, 
Cross-Cultural Style,” Cognition 92 (2004): B1-B12.
89. Stich, “Deconstructing the Mind.”
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strictly speaking, refer to anything would be appropriately ignored in 
deciding how wc use these terms. The point, well dem onstrated by 
Taylor, is that in the face of a variety of compelling pragmatic or nor­
mative considerations, it is reasonable to simply ignore semantic con­
siderations.90
If the only source of disagreement about ‘race’ talk were semantic, 
wc could simply pack up and go home. In the last section, wc saw that 
there is little genuine metaphysical disagreement. And semantic dis­
agreements between various racc theorists can be safely set aside in 
favor of a dialogue in which skeptics, constructionists, and naturalists 
discuss various natural and social phenom ena in alternate but meta­
physically equivalent theoretical idioms (or alternatively in some neutral 
vocabulary). However, it is clear that the case of racc is not so simple. 
While there is (or should be) a wide basis of metaphysical agreem ent 
on the expanded ontological consensus, there is profound disagreement 
over the practical and moral im port of ‘race’ talk. Resolving this dis­
agreem ent requires a complex assessment of many factors, including, 
the epistemic value of ‘race’ talk in various domains, the benefits and 
costs of racial identification and of the social enforcem ent of such iden­
tification, the value of racialized identities and communities fostered by 
‘race’ talk, the role of ‘race’ talk in prom oting or underm ining racism, 
the benefits or costs of ‘race’ talk in a process of rectification for past 
injustice, the cognitive or aesthetic value of ‘race’ talk, and the degree 
of entrenchm ent of ‘race’ talk in everyday discourse. The point is that 
it is on the basis of these and similar considerations that the issue of 
what to do with ‘race’ talk will be decided, no t putative metaphysical 
or actual semantic disagreements. Once wc recognize this, wc create a 
situation in which, in Taylor’s words, “very real and im portant ethical 
concerns can no longer hide in the shadow of metaphysical speculations.
. . . We’ll have to talk openly about the categories in public policy, 
because the option of implying answers to these questions” by reference 
to metaphysical or semantic considerations “will no longer be avail­
able.”91
To say that debates about ‘race’ talk arc normative, not metaphys­
ical, risks being misunderstood. What is normative is not what is in the 
world, but how, when, and where wc decide to talk about what is in the 
world. I have argued that the attem pt to link these two questions via 
the semantic strategy has, in the context of racc and ‘race’ talk, resulted 
in an illusion of metaphysical disagreement and a misplaced emphasis
90. Taylor, “Appiah’s Uncom pleted A rgum ent,” secs. 6-7.
91. Ibid., 126. As no ted  in the text, Taylor’s targe t is A pp iah ’s skepticism-cum- 
eliminativism. The present discussion extends to constructionist and naturalist conserva­
tionists also employing the semantic strategy.
on metaphysical and semantic concerns. Both arc best left behind. The 
alternative is to acknowledge the widespread metaphysical agreem ent 
and ask, with Sally Haslanger, what do wc want our racial concepts, 
terms, and practices to do?92
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92. Sally Ilaslanger, “G ender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them  
to Be?” Nous 34 (2000): 31-55.
